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LAWRENCE C. BERNEY* 
BANKING ON THE POOR, by ROBERT AYRES, MIT Press, 1984, 
Pp. 282 
Banking on the Poor presents the World Bank (the Bank) as a 
very cautious lending institution until Robert S. McNamara resigned 
as Secretary of Defense and became the Bank's president in 1968. 
Robert Ayres traces the evolution of Mr. McNamara's poverty-ori-
ented redirections at the Bank which replaced the previous trickle 
down approach to development. During Mr. McNamara's tenure 
(1968-81), the Bank expanded its lending commitments to over 
$12 billion in fiscal 1981 from less than $1 billion in fiscal 1968. 
Ayres, a political scientist, former Brookings Institution scholar, 
and fellow at the Overseas Development Council (ODC), provides 
an insightful inside view of the operations of the Bank under 
McNamara. The author conducted approximately 300 interviews 
with Bank staff and officials and was allowed access to a considerable 
number of internal documents. 
A product of the Bretton Woods conference of July 1944, The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, now 
known almost exclusively as the "World Bank," opened its doors in 
June 1946. 1 Its function was to assist in the reconstruction of war-
torn Europe and Japan and in the development of the less devel-
oped world. 2 In the decade that followed, the principal develop-
mental goal was to expand the aggregate growth rate. 3 To this end, 
lending was concentrated in areas such as transportation, commu-
nication facilities, port developments, power projects, etc.4 Lending 
to fields that included education, sanitation and health was es-
chewed as their contribution to growth was less measurable. 5 
The Bank, which has long been a target of the left for sup-
porting reactionary regimes, came under attack from the right dur-
ing the late seventies. The right charged that the Bank was sup-
porting socialist schemes and financing massive welfare programs 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL 
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4 EDWARD S. MASON AND ROBERT E. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON WOODS, 
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in the Third World. The author sides with neither the leftist nor 
the conservative critics of the Bank. He adopts a centrist view, 
emphasizing the Bank's reformist role.6 The book views reform as 
preferable to revolution and it largely looks at various ways of 
promoting reform. 7 The author rejects both conservative and rad-
ical models as inappropriate criteria for evaluating the Bank's anti-
poverty work. Those on the left desire that the Bank contribute to 
revolutionary change, something it is not in the business of doing. 
Those on the right appear to desire that the Bank become an 
underwriter of the plans of the private sector. This too would be 
alien to the Bank's development role. Ayres believes the Bank must 
be the judge in light of what its programs are trying to attain and 
not in light of externally prescribed criteria. Conservatives within 
the United States were concerned because McNamara's redirection 
of the Bank was wasting funds donated, in part, by the U.S. They 
thought the changes were doing little good for American business.8 
The poverty-oriented projects were termed "giveaways"9 with low 
rates of return at best. Ayres spends a good deal of his time de-
fending the Bank from its right wing critics. Although he dismisses 
the arguments on the left as overly simplistic, he does not spend 
enough time refuting some of the more persuasive criticism pre-
sented by the left. 
A provocative leftist critique of the Bank contends the right 
has nothing at all about which to complain. to The Bank and Mc-
Namara in no way repudiated the conservative old-style projects; 
lending for these continued and even increased under McNamara, 
but with the expansion of total lending it was possible to reduce the 
relative predominance of such projects by expanding the new types 
even more rapidly.11 While devising ways for its projects to reach 
the poor, the Bank more typically exerted its influence to keep wage 
levels low in order to encourage foreign investment and export 
business. 12 A passage from a country report provides a good ex-
ample: " ... continuously increasing wages without increased labor 
productivity may hamper Papua New Guinea's agricultural export 
6 Ayres, supra note 1, at 13. 
71d. 
BId. at 231. 
9ld. 
10 C. PAYER, THE WORLD BANK (1982). 
11 Id. at 26. 
121d. at 56. 
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growth by reducing its competitive strength vis-a-vis other export-
ers."13 
Ayres does not bother to refute the leftist argument that puts 
part of the blame of the poor's condition on the Bank. McNamara 
was quoted as saying in a 1974 press release "[t]hroughout the 
developing World, the rural poor have neither shared adequately 
in their country's progress, nor have themselves been able to con-
tribute significantly to it. Their destitution has in effect ruled them 
out of the entire development process."14 The Bank assumes the 
poor are poor because they have been "left behind" or "ignored" 
by their country's progress, when, in fact, most are poor because 
they are the victims of that so-called progress. 15 Their destitution 
has not "ruled them out" of the development process; the devel-
opment process is responsible for their destitution. 16 
The argument concludes by saying it would be hard indeed to 
make the Bank any more responsive to the interests of international 
capital than it was under McNamara, who joined the board of Royal 
Dutch Shell when he left the Bank. 17 In the last years of McN amara's 
presidency, the Bank had already begun to shift its emphasis away 
from the poverty-oriented projects to programs that would more 
directly aid international capital. 18 
As convincing as the above argument may be, Ayres does not 
attempt to defend the Bank from those forms of attack. Instead he 
concerns himself with evaluating the success of the methods the 
Bank adopted. Ayres sees the Bank as playing a reformist role as a 
development institution. He devotes the bulk of the book to an 
objective critique of the Bank's methods used to reach its intended 
goal; he does not continually throw into question the assumptions 
under which the Bank operates. He recognizes the Bank's limita-
tions, but points out this fact does not mean he must derogate its 
work. The reform that most interests Ayres is the Bank's attempt 
to start tackling poverty directly, instead of waiting for the benefits 
of economic growth to "trickle down" to the poor. The leftist attack 
on the Bank challenges the validity of that attempt. It contends that 
"all that needs to be done is to strip away the public facade of 
13 [d. 
14 [d. at 57. 
15 [d. at 57-58. 
16 [d. at 58. 
17 [d. at 355. 
18 [d. at 355-56. 
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concern for the poor and begin boasting of what [the Bank] has 
been doing all along" to quiet the critics on the right. 
In describing the activities and structure of the Bank, the au-
thor is quite balanced in his approach. He gives credit where it is 
due but is careful to point out the drawbacks as well. For example, 
the Bank is well known for its research work. Nevertheless, the 
people carrying out the research at the Bank were largely divorced 
from the operational staff. There was a tendency, Ayres points out, 
for the latter to view the researchers as misplaced academics who 
never built a dam or laid a road. 19 
By pointing out some of the outside constraints under which 
the Bank must operate Ayres demonstrates that all the Bank's prob-
lems are not self-inflicted. The external capital requirements of the 
developing countries are continuing to grow. This growth obliges 
the Bank to devote greater attention to its money moving activities 
than to poverty alleviation.20 Tensions have also developed between 
the IMF and the Bank. The Bank's role is to supply long-term 
capital for economic development projects. The Fund's role is to 
supply short and medium-term balance of payment financing for 
nations experiencing temporary disequilibria in their external ac-
counts. The Fund imposes strict conditions on borrowing countries. 
Since these conditions often entail a contraction of public credit, as 
well as freezing wages and reducing subsidies, many feel it has an 
adverse impact on the poor of the country. The author raises the 
issue as to whether the objectives of the Bank, with its long-term 
goals, and the Fund, with its short-term recipes, are at conflict. 21 
Ayres also raises some interesting political issues. Should the 
Bank lend money to undemocratic regimes? If a regime lapses into 
authoritarianism should the Bank exercise leverage on behalf of 
reform by withholding money?22 What about the issue of human 
rights? Should the Bank take a stand?23 Ayres defends the Bank's 
position to continue to lend to all types of governments. The Bank 
argues that no one else will make loans to small farmers in Pinochet's 
Chile.24 It is frustrating to the reader that these provocative issues 
are raised and barely discussed because they are outside the scope 
of the book. Ayres maintains his impartiality and raises these issues 
19 Ayres, supra note 1, at 29-30. 
20 [d. at 52. 
21 [d. at 53. 
22/d. at 55. 
2'[d. 
24 [d. at 56. 
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merely to point out the tremendous pressures under which the 
Bank must operate. 
Ayres also points out that the Bank must operate under the 
constraints of some of its more vocal donors, e.g. the U.S. The Bank 
made no new loans to Chile under Allende, nor were loans made 
to Peronist Argentina between 1973 and 1976.25 The message is 
that the Bank operates under impediments. The book falls short in 
this area, too; it brings up fascinating issues and then lets the reader 
down by moving on to other issues. 
Ayres is, at times, quite critical of the Bank. He attacks the 
Bank's organization and blames its central decision-making process 
for some of its failures in the anti-poverty program. Ninety-four 
percent of the professional staff is located in Washington where 
most decisions are made.26 "The priority placed upon the prompt 
meeting of targets . . . was sometimes seen to be at the expense of 
the nuances, subtleties, and ultimately the quality of the Bank's 
address of poverty alleviation."27 
Students interested in the workings of a large financial insti-
tution will find the book rewarding. A good description of how the 
Bank assesses how much a country may borrow is followed up with 
an interesting discussion of how politics also come into play when 
lending allocations are made. The Bank has maintained that lending 
has always been made on the basis of economic criteria alone. Po-
litical considerations are alleged to play no role in loan decisions; 
yet, Ayres is quick to point out that this claim was far from accurate. 
He cites as an example the decision to lend to a copper mine project 
shortly after Pinochet took power despite an economic report that 
stated Chile was suffering its worst depression since the 1930's.28 
The Bank's poverty-oriented thrust under McNamara raised 
some problems of country allocation, or the determination of which 
country would get how much new money. The countries that re-
ceived money for political reasons - e.g. Nicaragua under Samoza 
- were not exactly poverty-oriented. Allocation struggles were not 
always resolved in favor of countries with a serious commitment to 
alleviating poverty. 
A glaring omission in the discussion of lending allocations, in 
light of what we know today, is the Bank's role in fostering the debt 
25 [d. at 57. 
26 [d. at 65. 
27 [d. 
28 [d. at 71. 
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CriSIS. It would be interesting to know to what extent the Bank's 
lending programs contributed to a country's inability to meet its 
obligations. As has subsequently been learned, the idea of devel-
opment through growth has led too many countries to the brink of 
insolvency. The omission is understandable in that the crisis only 
became widely discussed after 1982, when Mexico declared it could 
not meet its obligations. 
Ayres is most critical when discussion moves to the theories of 
poverty alleviation. This chapter is not for the economic novice. 
Ayres details two theories of poverty alleviation. A volume entitled 
REDISTRIBUTION WITH GROWTH (RWG) marked the Bank's effort to 
spell out its approach to poverty alleviation. Under this approach 
the emphasis was on improving the absolute incomes of the poor, 
not on alleviating relative inequality. 29 
Helping the poor meant primarily increasing the income, pro-
ductivity, and output of the poor. The author is critical of the fact 
that the basic human needs (BHN) alternative, which he describes 
in depth, is dismissed by the Bank. The BHN approach to poverty 
alleviation is, Ayres contends, more direct and efficient than the 
RWG approach. Principal emphasis is put on the satisfaction of 
material needs. The approach involves establishing an inventory of 
core basic needs, formulating targets, and calculating what it would 
cost to make up the shortfalls in a specified time.30 He does an 
excellent job rationalizing why the Bank followed the RWG ap-
proach: it was not radical, it would not be distasteful to the power 
elite in the country, and it was an approach the professional econ-
omists at the Bank could understand. 
Ayres is less critical of the Bank's failure to be at the forefront 
of those championing a new economic order. Given that the devel-
oped countries are the principal donors to the Bank, it would be 
inappropriate for the Bank to call for a transformation of the 
existing North-South relationships. "In neither a national nor in-
ternational sense did [the Bank] seek fundamentally to change the 
world in which the poor lived; it sought to improve the terms on 
which they related to it."31 
A good portion of the book is spent analyzing the various anti-
poverty projects developed under McNamara, the most celebrated 
of which was its rural development projects. Here the Bank made 
29 [d. at 89. 
30 [d. at 84. 
31 [d. at 89. 
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its most radical departure from its past lending programs. Ayres 
demonstrates his objectivity by not hailing these projects as great 
successes. Instead he points out the vast majority of the beneficiaries 
were farmers who owned their own land. The projects were not 
designed to reach the landless, or the poorest of the poor.32 An 
additional limitation on the effectiveness of the rural development 
projects was their size. As an example, Ayres points out one rural 
project in Brazil was $11.5 million compared to a steel project in 
the same country for $2.1 billion.33 
A metaphor Ayres borrowed from a Bank observer to describe 
the internal disputes regarding the rural development programs is 
useful in relating the obstacles McNamara faced. The Bank is seen 
as a large ship heading full steam in one direction. The direction 
was that of trickle-down and support for economic infrastructure 
in developing countries. The "crew" had been instructed in the 
techniques of this direction and were content with it. McNamara's 
anti-poverty programs marked the beginning of a somewhat abrupt 
attempt to engineer a sharp turn. The captain's orders did not 
always make it down to the crew. While there was no outright 
mutiny, there was footdragging. Despite new orders, previous com-
mitments to arrive at certain "ports" (projects already committed) 
could not be readily abandoned. To make matters worse, the 
"waters" (targeted countries) were not always cooperative.34 
Ayres avoids answering the difficult question: has the World 
Bank been effective in helping the rural poor? Although he devotes 
an entire chapter to an analysis of the implementation of rural 
poverty projects he claims the newness of the Bank's work militates 
against drawing conclusions about their success or failure. Another 
observer is less diplomatic. 
Although the Bank advocates major policy changes necessary 
for an effective rural strategy, it will suspend lending if political 
turmoil accompanies a movement leading to change in a coun-
try's internal distribution of power and influence. Given its in-
stitutional and structural position it is unable to behave other-
wise. The contradiction between what the Bank says should be 
done, and what it can or does do, makes it a singularly unsuit-
able institution to practice what it preaches.35 
3. [d. at 102. 
33 Id. at 106. 
M [d. at 110-11. 
35 Aart J. M. Van de Laar, The World Bank and the World's Poor, 4 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
849 (Oct.-Nov. 1976). 
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Ayres exhibits a cynical view of the politics of foreign aid. He 
proposes several reasons why many countries that had no interest 
in the plight of the poor (Argentina, Brazil under the Generals, 
Chile) accept the anti-poverty aid. For example, a country might 
submit to poverty-oriented projects because it believed that if it 
accommodates the Bank's emphasis today, it may get what it really 
wants at a later date, like steel mills. Reasons for engaging in pov-
erty-oriented projects have little or nothing to do with a country's 
sincerity. By not having to finance a much needed rural develop-
ment project a government will have more money to spend on other 
nondevelopmental concerns. Although the willingness to implement 
poverty-oriented projects might be a cheap way of simulating a 
concern with poverty, the subject is often more complex, i.e. can 
the effects of the projects be contained within the area in which it 
was intended? 
Ayres suggests that there are two possible answers to that ques-
tion. On the one hand a project may actually assist in the avoidance 
of attacking structural causes of the country's economic problems. 
A rural project may serve as an instrument to quell potentially 
troublesome groups who seek significant change. On the other hand 
a project might set off unrest. A group of peasants in an untouched 
region may want the same type of project in their region. Ayres 
illustrates this issue of containment by describing the wide ranging 
effects of a reform movement in Chile under Frei from 1964-1970. 
According to Ayres, it was more important to the Bank that its 
poverty-oriented projects were implemented than why they were 
implemented. The underlying political rationale of the Bank was 
political stability through giving people a stake in the system. The 
projects and economic reforms were designed to cultivate stability. 
Leftist critics see the poverty-oriented projects as holding back the 
forces of real change. Without the Bank projects the now poor 
would become even poorer; there would be heightened contradic-
tions in the existing socioeconomic structure and the whole system 
would eventually crumble. Ayres does not give much weight to this 
view and is more concerned with defending the Bank from attack 
from the right. 
Ayres defends the Bank from the right by showing that the 
Bank's poverty-oriented projects did not sacrifice its growth objec-
tives. Before McNamara, the Bank saw the main route to growth 
through improvements in infrastructure: roads, dams, steel mills, 
etc. Under his leadership the route was widened to include human 
resource development and assistance for small-scale farmers. The 
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objective remained the same. The rates of return on poverty-ori-
ented projects were generally satisfactory. The allocation of Bank 
funds was generally in the interests of American foreign policy. 
Although Ayres is concerned with defending the Bank from 
attacks from the right he is not particularly worried about the 
developed countries withdrawing their support of the Bank. By the 
year 2000 over one billion people will be living a "life so limited by 
malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, high infant mortality, and low life 
expectancy as to be beneath any rational definition of human de-
cency."36 If not on moral or ethical grounds the developed world 
cares about this projection on economic grounds. An amelioration 
of the plight of the developing world's poor would greatly expand 
world markets for the developed world. The Bank's concern about 
poverty is important for political and strategic reasons too. A greater 
Bank effort to overcome absolute poverty would be compatible with 
the interests of the developed world in political stability. Ayres 
rightly points out that the real question confronting the Bank and 
the developed world is not whether they can afford to care but how 
to act upon their valid concern about poverty. 
Ayres concludes with the correct observation that a structure 
of North-South relations that would be more facilitative of the 
poverty-oriented projects is sorely needed. Some of the debate 
about the effectiveness of the Bank in reaching the world's poor 
would be resolved if adverse international and national constraints 
on development were reduced. Unfortunately, the "new interna-
tional economic order" is not yet part of the vocabulary of the 
Bank.37 
36 Ayres, supra note 1, at 245. 
37 Edwards, Symposium: NIEO: Development or Dependency?, 3A PUBLIC LAW FORUM 89, 90 
(1984). 
